Ferdinand de Saussure

Contemporary semiological theory derives from the writings of two renowned scholars, the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and the American philosopher, Charles Saunders Pierce (1839-1914).

Saussure's theory holds that linguistic signs are composed of the arbitrary combination of sound patterns and concepts. The sound pattern or signifier is the material vehicle of the meaning, its concrete dimension; the concept or signified is its "abstract" side. While the signifier and the signified can be separated for analytical purposes, in reality they are inseparable. Roland Barthes provides the example of the signifier, the word ROSE. This conjures up the concept or signifier "passion". In analytic terms there are three elements in the communicative process: the signifier, ROSE; the concept which is signified, "passion"; and the sign, "passionified roses". The relation between ROSE and "passion" is arbitrary. This means that the link between ROSE and passion is not natural, but has come to be accepted through convention in our particular culture. In another culture the word ROSE might signify something quite different. (Remember we came across an instance of this in Umberto Eco's example of No More which signifies quite different meanings in English and Italian.)

Saussure and Anti-Nomenclaturism

Saussure argued against the view which had dominated Western thought for centuries, which derived from the Bible sources and from Plato, that language is a nomenclature. Nomenclaturism invokes the notion that names for things are somehow "given" or "natural"; that originally in the Garden of Eden things were called by their correct names which reflected their true essences. In this view, words have a meaning because they stand for something else. At the time of Saussure the question puzzling theorists was whether a word stands for something which independently exists in the world, or whether it stands for an idea in the mind? Saussure challenged the view that language is a nomenclature, a list of words standing for a list of things. He argued that this line of reasoning presupposes that ideas exist independently of words, that it does not clarify whether words are vocal or psychological and that it sees the connection between a name and a thing as essentially unproblematic.

Culler (1976) provides several examples of the difficulties with the notion that language is a nomenclature.

1. Words are organised in different ways in different languages. If language were simply a list of words standing for a list of things, then it ought to be comparatively simple to translate from one language to another: one would simply replace the French name with the English name and so on. However, one problem is that the range of concepts signified differs from language to language. Thus the French word "aimer" does not go directly into English; one must choose between "to like" and "to love". Similarly the two signifieds "connaitre" and "savoir" cover the English "to know". There is no concept in French for "wicked" or "pet".
2. If language were a set of names which applied to independently existing concepts, then one would expect to see the concepts remain stable over time. However, history is full of concepts changing. At one time the concept "silly" referred to someone who was "pious" and "blessed". By the beginning of the sixteenth century "silly" meant "innocent", "helpless" and even "deserving of pity". The concept continued to alter until eventually a "silly" person was "simple", "foolish" and "stupid".

If language were a nomenclature then a distinct number of concepts should exist; the concept "silly" should apply first to one and then to another and we should be able to discern when the "break-point" arose when one concept slipped into another. Clearly this has not happened. Rather the concept "silly" has gradually shifted its boundaries, changing its semantic shape and articulating the world in different ways from one period to the next.

The fact that languages work with different conceptual distinctions indicates that these distinctions are not inevitable or natural; they are arbitrary. The fact that they are part of a shifting continuum and not autonomous entities means that they are members of a system and are defined by their relation to other members of that system.

Meaning as Difference within a System

That The fact that ROSE signifies "passion", The fact sign "passionified roses" within a whole network of signs within which its meaning is fixed. Within this network individual signs gain their meaning, not because of some essential quality, as the nomenclaturists would have it, but because of the differences between signs. For example, the signifiers ROSE, POSE, NOSE RAZE and ROWS conjure up quite different signifieds.

Put in another way, words and objects do not so much derive their meaning from their intrinsic being as from the differences which exist between them and other words or objects. Thus we would find it very difficult to explain the concept "brown" to some Martians merely by showing them a range of brown objects. We would be much more likely to be successful if we were to contrast objects which are brown with objects which are of different colours such as red, blue and green. This of course assumes that the Martian will perceive brown in the way that we do. The central point is that meaning is acquired within the context of a set of relationships of difference which are arbitrarily set by convention.

Signifier, Signified and Referent

So words are not independent from thought, nor do they stand for things which exist independently "out there". Rather the vocal aspect, the sound image, or signifier (e.g. the written word) and the concept or signified are fused together in the sign. What about the "thing" itself? Within the parlance of semiology this is referred to as the referent. Saussure says that with the word H-O-R-S-E, the concept of "horse" is what is signified, the referent is what kicks you. The "real" thing is thus external to the sign, whereas the signified is a part of it.

Langue and Parole (Language and Speech).

Saussure draws a major distinction between the language system, which he refers to as la langue (language) and la parole (speech). The organized totality which constitutes language provides a social network of rules from which individual speakers draw in producing speech which will be readily comprehensible by others. According to Saussure, the researcher should not try to analyse parole or speech, as this constitutes the superficial aspect of the underlying system of rules which constituted langue. This focus on la langue or the structure of rules which underpin language gave rise to a most influential movement known as structuralism.

The Synchronic and the Diachronic Saussure draws a distinction between two forms of analysis: synchronic, which involves the investigation of a system of meanings at one point in time, and diachronic, which explores the ways in which meanings shift over time. As Saussure's main emphasis was on how individual concepts and objects gain their meaning through the position which they occupy within a network of signs, he advocated the synchronic approach. However contemporary theorists such as Vladimir Propp, among others, have focused on using diachronic forms of analysis.

Syntagmatic and Paradigmatic Relations

Syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations follow from the distinction which de Saussure makes between synchronic and diachronic perspectives. Although these reflect different levels of combination, both interact with each other in the production of meaning. Paradigmatic relations refer to the vertical relations and syntagmatic relations refer to horizontal relations. Take the example below. The vertical relations, girl, woman, man and pig, represent paradigmatic alternatives; only one may be "legally" chosen to complete a sentence. The syntagmatic relation is expressed as the number of permissible ways in which words may be combined to form a sentence. The rules which determine this are syntactic rules.

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